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The Burger Court and Prosecutorial 
Misconduct 
By Bennett l. Gershman· 
Professor Gershman critically examines a series of recenl Su-
fpreme Court decisions de{lling wilh prosecutorial misconduct. In 
~ach case, the Court reversed the lower courl and reinslated the 
?conviclion. 
;.> There are a broad range of issues involved; from suppression of 
f~vidence 10 trial misconduct. As a former proseculor in New York 
ICity, the author is forced 10 conclude thaI, "Proseclltorial miscoll-
'ouct occurs because il works and because sanctions for misbehavior 
'are virtually nonexistent. " 
:Much of the debate surrounding the Burger Court's criminal 
~ustice jurisprudence has focused on its Fourth and Fifth 
fimendment decisions and the extent to which they loosen some 
~fthe due process restrictions imposed on police conduct by the 
[Warren Court. But commentators have largely overlooked the ~llfger Court's treatment of an area in criminal justice that is 
'~y~n more malignant and unchecked than police misconduct: 
ib'use of power by prosecutors . 
~;' The prosecutor is the dominant figure in the U.S. criminal 
ddstice system. The prosecutor decides whether to bring crimi-
~iilil charges; whom to charge; what charges to bring; whether a 
)\ieCendant will stand trial , plead guilty, or enter a correctional 
~program in lieu of criminal charges; and whether to confer 
~:,:, 
\.". ,,';., 
~L~:._* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author's book on 
,'PrO,eculorial Mi,conduct has recently been published by Clark Boardman and is 
);relficwed in this issue of Criminal Law Bulletin. 
;;:L:·-As this article went to press , the Supreme Court decided another case of pros· 
;.Icutorial misconduct which involved highly improper arguments to Ihe jury. The 
'4ecision in United Slales v. Young, _ U.S. _ (Feb. 20, 1985), strikingly reinforces 
~_~_~e of the central theses of this article: the Supreme Court's undue tolerance of 
~prosecutorial transgressions at the expense of the defendant's right to a fair trial. In 
: ~oung. the Court of Appeals for the Tenlh Circuit reversed a mail fraud conviction, 
;~_lding that the prosecutor's remarks during summation, although not objected to. 
~alIegedly in response to defense counsel's summation, constituted "plain error" 
.Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and denied the defen-
~dant a fair trial. Reversing the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court agreed that the 
prosecutor's conduct was improper but nevertheless ruled 5·4 that the misconduct 
)"as nol sufficiently prejudicial in view of the strength of the government's case and 
,~efense counsel's failure to object to the offending remarks. 
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immunity from prosecution . In short, the prosecutor holds the 
power to make decisions that control and even destroy people 's 
careers , reputations, and lives. Long ago , the Supreme Court 
wrote what has become the classic statement of the pros-
ecutor' s role: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done. As such , he is in a peculiar and very 
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with ear-
nestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But , while he may strike 
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty 
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just 
one, 1 
This practical and ethical obligation was put to the test in a 
series of decisions of the Burger Court during the past three 
terms. In each case, an appellate court reversed a conviction on 
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, and in each case the Su-
preme Court reversed the lower court and reinstated the convic-
tion. Apart from their crucial holdings, these decisions have a 
darker significance. They evince a consistent, unyielding phi-
losophy of judicial permissiveness toward prosecutorial exces-
ses. The emerging themes are unmistakable: (1) an undue defer-
ence to the executive branch; (2) curtailment of the federal 
courts' supervisory power to discipline and deter prosecutorial 
misconduct; (3) imposition of procedural rules rendering proof 
of misconduct virtually impossible ; and (4) refusal to articulate 
or even require ethical standards of prosecutors. When juxta-
posed with recent pronouncements of the Court that have 
tolerated other instances of outrageous government misbehav-
ior,' these decisions have the further unwholesome effect of 
encouraging prosecutorial overreaching. If one were keeping a 
box score of the Burger Court, the tally would read: 
I Burger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
, United States v. Morrison , 449 U.S. 361 (1981) (violation of Sixth Amendment 
rights); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (violation of Fourth Amend-
ment rights); Hampton v. United States . 425 U.S. 484 (1 976) (entrapment). 
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Foul Blows-7 
Fair Play-O 
The decisions cover a broad range of procedural issues. 
Smith v. Phillips,' United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal: and 
California v. Trombetta ' are concerned with the prosecutor' s 
suppression of evidence; United States v. Hasting' with foren-
'. sic misconduct; Mabry v. Johnson' with breach of a plea bar-
gain ; United States y. Goodwin ' with vindictiveness in charging 
crime; and Oregon v. Kennedy' with trial misconduct that 
provokes a mistrial. In each case, the lower court found that the 
prosecutor engaged in blatant or otherwise improper behavior 
prejudicing the defendant's right to a fair trial. 
Suppression of Evidence 
In the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland, 1O the Warren 
Court held that due process was violated when a prosecutor 
secreted material evidence favorable to the defendant. The re-
ports are filled with reprehensible examples of prosecutorial 
suppression of exculpatory evidence. The Burger Court, al-
though adhering to the Brady doctrine in principle," has 
confined its application to only the most self-evident viola-
tions . This area is an outstanding example of the Court's insen-
sitivity to prosecutorial misconduct and the right of defendants 
to a fair trial. 
In Smith v. Phillips, for instance, the prosecutor learned 
during a murder trial that one of the jurors was vigorously 
seeking employment as an investigator with the same pros-
ecutor's office . The prosecutor suppressed this information 
3455 U.S. 209 (1982). 
, 458 U.S. 8585 (1982). 
, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984). 
, 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983). 
, 104 S. Ct. 2543 (1984). 
• 457 U.S . 368 (1982). 
• 456 U.S. 667 (1982). 
" 373 U.S. 83 (1963) . 
II See United Slates v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Moore v. Illinois , 408 U.S. 786 
(1972); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
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until after the jury con victed the defendant. The Second Circuit 
on a petition for habeas corpus, found that due process had 
been violated and vacated the conviction." The Supreme 
Court, per Justice Rehnquist, disagreed. First, since there was 
no showing of" actual bias" by the juror-the standard requiTed 
by the Court-the lower court's finding of "implied bias" was 
irrelevant. Second, although the prosecutor's conduct was "not 
condoned," there was no showing that the defendant was prej-
udiced by the nondisclosure. Ethical standards may be over-
looked, said the Court, because the "touchstone of due process 
analysis is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor." The Court finally admonished tribunals not to Use 
their authority to correct prosecutorial misbehavior in state 
courts absent a specific constitutional violation. 
Another variation of the Brady doctrine occurred in United 
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal. Here the prosecutor ordered the 
deportation of illegal-alien eyewitnesses to the defendant's 
crime before they would be interviewed by defense counsel. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that the 
prosecutor's conduct deprived the defendant of his Fifth 
Amendment due process and Sixth Amendment compulsory 
process rights to obtain material and relevant evidence to prove 
his innocence." The Supreme Court, per Justice Rehnquist, 
reversed. The lower court "misapprehended the varied nature 
of the duties of the Executive Branch." The prompt deportation 
of illegal aliens is an overriding duty to which the Court will 
defer absent a "plausible showing" that the lost evidence would 
be material and favorable to the defense. Of course, as the 
dissent pointed out, showing the importance of evidence with-
out an opportunity to examine that evidence can be exceedingly 
difficult. 
Finally, in California v. Trombetta, the Court addressed for 
the first time a Brady issue that had divided lower courts: the 
prosecutor's responsibility to preserve favorable evidence for 
the defendant's later use. In Trombetta, law enforcement 
officials destroyed breath samples taken from the defendant and 
used in his prosecution for intoxicated driving. The California 
appeals court reversed the conviction, finding that the failure to 
" 632 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1980). 
" 647 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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preserve vital evidence used against the defendant violates due 
process.14 The Supreme Court disagreed. Although a duty to 
preserve evidence was not entirely ruled out, "that duty must 
be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a sig-
nificant role in the suspect's defense. " To meet this standard of 
materiality, the evidence must possess an exculpatory quality 
that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed and be of 
such nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain com-
parable evidence. Neither of these tests was met, according to 
the Court. 
Forensic Misconduct 
The prosecutor's abuse and disregard of forensic propriety 
is a familiar complaint. Dean Roscoe Pound observed more than 
fifty years ago that such misconduct "threatened to become 
staple in U .S.prosecutions. "IS Today, virtually every federal 
and state court has bemoaned the " disturbing frequency" and 
"unheeded condemnations" of flagrant and unethical pros-
ecutorial behavior. ,. The failure of courts to deal firmly with 
such misconduct, Judge Jerome Frank warned, encourages 
prosecutorial excesses and "breeds a deplorably cynical atti-
tude towards the judiciary." 17 Apart from occasional ceremonial 
language, the Burger Court has defaulted in this area as well. In 
United States v. Hasting , the Court's most recent decision 
addressing forensic misconduct, the Seventh Circuit reversed a 
kidnapping conviction because during summation the pros-
" 142 Cal. App. 3d 138, 190 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1983). 
15 R. Pound, Criminal Justice in America 187 (1930). 
" See, e.g., United Slates v. Maccini, 721 F.2d 840, 846 (1st Cir. 1983) ("rep-
rehensible . .. disregard to our directives"); United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 
1174, 1183 (2d Cir. 1981) ("frustration" at " unheeded condemnations"); United 
States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.2d 110, 112 (7th Cir. 1980) (" problem continues to arise 
with disturbing frequency throughout this circuit despite the admonition of trial 
judges and this court"); Eberhardt v. Bordenkircher, 605 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 
1979) (court repeatedly condemns unethical activity of prosecutors); United States v, 
Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 371 (3d Cir.) (repeated warnings to prosecutors becoming 
familiar routine), cerro denied. 442 U.S. 944 (1979); United States v. Morris, 568 F .2d 
396, 401 (5th Cir. 1978) ("continuing problem" of prosecutorial misconduct). The 
state appellate courts express similar frustration . See People v. Biondo, 16 Mich. 
App. 166, 157,256 N.W.2d 60, 61 (1977). 
" United States V. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F .2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946) 
(dissenting opinion). 
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ecutor repeatedly commented on the defendants' failure to tes-
tify in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights under Griffin v. 
California. 18 Because prosecutors in that circuit consistently 
defied the court's repeated admonitions against such improper 
remarks, the court used its supervisory powers to discipline the 
prosecutor and deter future similar misconduct. I' The Supreme 
Court reversed. In its zeal to chastise prosecutorial overreach-
ing, the Chief Justice wrote, the circuit court ignored the harm-
less error doctrine . Since no trial is error-free, the harmless 
error doctrine protects society'S and the victim's interest in 
preserving convictions of guilty defendants. Here the forensic 
impropriety was harmless, the Court concluded. Punishment of 
errant prosecutors may be accomplished by other procedures 
but not by reversal. 
Plea Bargaining 
Since guilty pleas account for over 90 percent of all criminal 
convictions, their regulation by the courts is essential to the fair 
administration of criminal justice. The Supreme Court has 
legitimized plea bargaining and even authorized the pros-
ecutor's use of extremely coercive tactics to force a plea. 2• In 
this twilight zone of criminal justice, the prosecutor's virtually 
unfettered power can deny fundamental fairness . A good illus-
tration is Mabry v. Johnson. There the prosecutor offered a plea 
bargain which the defendant accepted, only to be told later that 
the prosecutor "made a mistake" and was withdrawing his 
offer. The Eighth Circuit, in accord with other circuits, granted 
the defendant's petition for habeas corpus following his convic-
tion, finding that fairness precluded the prosecutor's reneging 
on a plea proposal once it was accepted by the defendant. 21 The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the guilty plea implicates 
the Constitution; the bargain is merely an "executory agree-
ment" which, until embodied in the formal plea, does not de-
prive an accused of any constitutionally protected interest. 
I' 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
" 660 F.2d 301 (7lh Cir. 1981). 
20 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U .S. 357 (1978); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 
U.S. 790 (1970). 
" 707 F.2d 323 (81h Cir. 1983). 
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. "The Due Process Clause is not a code of ethics for prosecu-
tors," said the Court in upholding the prosecutor's conduct. 
Vindictive Charging 
The prosecutor's vast power to charge crime is modestly 
limited by the doctrine of vindictiveness. Invoked for the first 
time by the Warren Court to remedy retaliatory sentences by 
judges on due process grounds," the doctrine was extended to 
prosecutors who increased charges after defendants exercised 
constitutional or statutory rights.23 The procedural contexts in 
which prosecutors have retaliated vary. Several courts invoked 
a presumption of vindictiveness when it reasonably appeared 
from the procedural setting and circumstances that the pros-
ecutor was acting with a retaliatory motive. 24 Thus in United 
States v. Goodwin the Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction 
because the prosecutor increased assault charges from a mis-
demeanor to a felony after the defendant refused to plead 
guilty.25 Although no actual vindictiveness was found, the court 
applied a presumption, placing the burden on the prosecutor to 
show by objective reasons that the increased charges could not 
have been brought before the defendant exercised his rights. 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court once again adopted 
the prosecutor's position, refusing to assume that prosecutors 
might seek to penalize or deter a defendant's exercise of rights. 
Particularly in the pretrial setting, said the Court, a prosecutor 
should remain free to exercise his broad discretion and not be 
bound by his previous conduct. The broad language of the 
decision, however, seems to extend well beyond the pretrial 
period. The prosecutor's charging decision, said the Court in 
conclusion, is "presumptively lawful," and a defendant can 
rebut that presumption only by proving objectively that the 
prosecutor was vindictively motivated. 
" North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
23 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 20 (1974). 
24 United States v. Motley, 665 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Jami-
son, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Lippi, 435 F. Supp. 808 (D.N.J. 
1977). 
" 637 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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Trial Misconduct 
Prosecutorial misconduct during trial often is pervasive and 
persistent. Such conduct can include presenting inflammatory 
or otherwise inadmissible evidence, refusing to heed the court's 
admonishments, admitting false evidence, and insinuating guilt 
by attacking the defendant's character. When the conduct be-
comes egregious, a mistrial may be declared on the defendant's 
demand. In ·such cases, some courts have invoked the double 
jeopardy clause to bar retrial on the ground that the pros-
ecutor's behavior literally deprived the defendant of his chosen 
jury, thereby forcing him to be twice placed in jeopardy. Two 
standards have been applied to determine whether double 
jeopardy should be invoked. First, some courts looked to the 
extent and seriousness of the prosecutor's misconduct and 
barred retrial when such conduct constituted " overreaching" or 
"harassment" that deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The 
second test barred retrial only when the prosecutor 's miscon-
duct was specifically intended to provoke a mistrial. In Oregon 
v. Kennedy a state prosecutor during trial asked a highly im-
proper question insinuating that the defendant had a prior crim-
inal record. A mistrial was declared at the defendant's request , 
and retrial was barred under double jeopardy because the con-
duct was found sufficiently overreaching and prejudicial. 26 The 
Supreme Court , in reversing, adopted the more restrictive stan-
dard requiring proof that the prosecutor's actions were specif-
ically intended to goad the defendant into seeking a mistrial. The 
more stringent standard was chosen because the more liberal 
test was considered too " amorphous" and .. standardless." In 
criticizing the majority' s choice, several members of the Court 
suggested that proving that the prosecutor's motive was to 
provoke a mistrial, instead of simply trying to prejudice the 
defendant generally, is .. almost inconceivable ." 
Breeding Cynicism and Encouraging Disrespect 
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs because it works and be-
cause sanctions for misbehavior are virtually nonexistent. If 
effective sanctions did exist , prosecutors would be less tempted 
to indulge in some of the practices described above. The num-
26 49 Or. App. 415 , 619 P .2d 948 (1980). 
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L ber of prosecutors held in contempt, disciplined by bar associa-
tion grievance committees, or sued civilly is astonishingly low. 
Although the major responsibility for controlling prosecu-
:: torial excesses rests on the judiciary, many courts, and most 
notably the Supreme Court, have defaulted and have abdicated 
much of their power to the executive branch and its prosecu-
torial agents. Time and again the Supreme Court has deferred to 
. the prosecutor's conduct, judgment, and exercise of discretion. 
The presumption of prosecutorial good faith echoes throughout 
• the decisions. When no specific constitutional right has been 
implicated, as in Valen zuela-Bernal, the deference is total. The 
Court could have preserved its independence in that case sim-
ply by requiring the prosecutor to elect which of the two over-
riding policies to pursue-deportation or criminal prosecution . 
Instead, the Court gave the prosecutor the entire loaf, but at the 
cost of denying the defendant a fair trial. 
The Court also has undermined the efforts of lower courts to 
control prosecutorial excesses through use of the supervisory 
power doctrine. Although this doctrine has been invoked spar-
ingly, the Court has reprimanded such attempts to discipline 
errant government officials as an improvident exercise by the 
judiciary of a "chancellor's foot veto over law enforcement 
practices of which [a court) does not approve. " 27 Such a 
response is most regrettable in a case like United Slales v. 
Hasting; first, because the circuit court of appeals used its 
disciplinary powers properly and only after repeated admoni-
tions to prosecutors were flaunted; and second, because the 
Supreme Court elevated the harmless error doctrine to a level 
that all but dwarfed the interests of a fair trial. Such blinking at 
misconduct truly breeds cynicism and disrespect. 
By the same token, the Court's fashioning of procedural 
rules governing proof of misconduct has been unrealistic and at 
times absurd. Requiring proof, as in Oregon v. Kennedy, that a 
prosecutor engaged in trial misconduct with the specific intent 
to cause a mistrial is practically impossible, short of an outright 
admission. Equally unrealistic is proving a juror's actual bias 
(Smith v. Phillips) ; a prosecutor' s actual vindictiveness (United 
States v. Goodwin); the probative value of absent eyewitnesses 
(United States v. Valenzuela-Benal); or of other lost evidence 
27 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S . 423,435 (1973). 
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(Trombetta v. California). When misconduct is insulated frOIll 
attack, there is no incentive to discontinue the practice. 
Conclusion 
Most troubling of all, however, is the Court 's failure to 
articulate ethical norms to guide prosecutors. The theme too 
often heard is that the due process clause is not a code of ethics 
for prosecutors and that prejudice to the defendant, not the 
culpability of the prosecutor, is the touchstone concern. This 
philosophy is intolerable. First, it offers no guideposts from the 
highest court in the nation to the most powerful official in the 
criminal justice system on the ethical limits of conduct. Second, 
it invites the prosecutor to be a law unto himself, as long as no 
specific constitutional rights are violated and the prejudice is 
kept to a moderate level, or even raised to an immoderate level 
if the proof of guilt is strong enough to render misconduct 
"harmless. " 
In policing prosecutorial misconduct, then, the Burger Court 
has been a friendly traffic cop which has given the prosecutor 
the green light almost all of the time. If prosecutors cannot 
restrain themselves and resist the temptation to misconduct, 
victims of misconduct will find no ally in the Supreme Court. 
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